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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Plaintiffs and appellants: Jesse and Alison Hammons.
Defendants and appellees: Weber County, Weber County Commission, Jan
Zogmaister, Kerry Gibson, Matthew Bell, John Ulibarri, and Ricky Hatch.
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INTRODUCTION

This dispute deals with the Property Tax Act's residential exemption. The
residential exemption, found in Utah Code §

59-2-1031,

reduces by forty-five

percent the fair market value at which counties assess residential properties for
property taxes. But the exemption is limited, subject to some exceptions
inapplicable here, to one acre ofland per residence and one primary residence per
household.
Sometime prior to the time Weber County sent out assessment notices in
2007,

the county assessor flagged the appellants' (the Hammonses) home, which

had been enjoying the residential exemption, as a possible non-primary residence
based on its location and use of a post office box for its address. The assessor
asserts that he sent a form to the Hammonses asking them to verify that the home
was indeed their primary residence. The Hammonses claim they never received
the assessor's letter. Without a response, the assessor did not apply the residential
exemption and assessed the Hammonses' home at full market value in
2008,

2007

and

until he received a verification from the Hammonses in 2009 that the home

was their primary residence. The county assessor then began applying the
exemption again in 2009.

The appellees reference the statutes in general terms here. They identify the
precise versions at issue below.
1
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Despite receiving assessment notices showing that their home was being
assessed at its full value, the Hammonses did not appeal those valuations to the
board of equalization under Utah Code § 59-2-1004, nor did they pay their taxes
under protest, which would have allowed them to challenge the taxes later under
Utah Code§ 59-2-1327. They instead paid their property taxes in 2007 and 2008
based on the full market value of their home without protest.

@

It was not until several years later, in late 2012, that the Hammonses,

through counsel, demanded refunds for the difference in the taxes they paid in
2007 and 2008 versus what they would have paid had the assessor applied the

@

residential exemption to their home. The Weber County Assessor, the Weber
County Tax Review Committee, and the Weber County Commission all rejected the
Hammonses' demands, and the Hammonses eventually filed suit in summer 2014,
seeking refunds and damages based on various claims.
The Hammonses here appeal from the district court's partial judgment on
the pleadings dismissing their claims that their payments should be refunded
under Utah Code § 59-2-1321, which allows refunds for redundant, erroneous, or
illegal payments. The appellees ("County") contend that the Hammonses' claims
are untimely and do not properly fit within section 59-2-1321's scope. The County
also alternatively argues that the county assessor was authorized to take the actions
he did. Finally, the County requests, if the Court reverses the district court's
decision, to limit its opinion's retroactive effect to this suit.
8
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court had original jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code § 78A3-102(3)(j)2. By order on 25 January 2016 the Court transferred it to the Utah
Court of Appeals as permitted by Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(4). This Court vacated
that transfer and recalled the appeal by order on 12 January 2017.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

First Issue. Were the claims the Hammonses filed in 2014 for refunds of taxes

they paid without protest in 2007 and 2008 timely under the four-year statute of
limitations applicable to actions brought under Utah Code§ 59-2-1321?

Standard of Review and Preservation: Correctness. "[A]pplication of a statute of
limitations to bar an action presents a question of law that we review for
correctness." Gillmore v. Summit County, 2010 UT 69, ,r 16, 246 P.3d 102
(footnote omitted). This issue presents an alternative ground for affirmance. State

v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r 9, 76 P.3d 1159 ("[A]n appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent
on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, .... "' (quoting Bailey v. Bayles,
2002 UT 58, ,I 10, 52 P.3d 1158) (quotation marks and citations omitted)).

2 From this point forward, the County cites to statutes' current versions unless
otherwise specified.
9
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Second Issue. If the Hammonses' section 59-2-1321 claims were timely, were

they based on erroneous and illegal collections within that section's scope?

Standard of Review and Preservation: Correctness. The district court implicitly
held that the Hammonses' claims were not properly brought under section 59-21321 when it granted in part the County's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
That decision is reviewed for correctness. West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT
App 222, ,r 4, 139 P.3d 1059. A grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
affirmed '"only if, as a matter oflaw, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts
alleged."' Id. (quoting Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898
(Utah 1990)). The facts from the complaint are taken as true and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. This issue is also
a question of statutory interpretation, which is likewise reviewed for correctness.

State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, 1 12, 236 P.3d 161 ("Issues involving
interpretation of statutes and common law are questions of law, reviewed for
correctness."). This issue is preserved at R.0432-0434.
Third Issue. Alternatively, was the elected county assessor authorized to

investigate whether the property at issue was the Hammonses' primary residence
and therefore qualified to receive the residential exemption, and if he was
unpersuaded that it did, to not apply the exemption when valuing their property?

Standard of Review and Preservation: Correctness. The district court also made
this challenged holding when it granted in part the County's motion for judgment
10
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~

on the pleadings. That decision is reviewed for correctness. See above for the
authorities cited for the second issue. This issue is preserved at R.0429-0432.
Fourth Issue. If the Court holds that the Hammonses' claims were timely,

properly brought under section 59-2-1321, or that the county assessor acted
illegally, should it limit its opinion's retroactive effect to this suit?

Standard of Review and Preservation: Because the retroactive and prospective
effect of its opinions arises from a rule of judicial policy imposed by the Court on
its own decisions, there is no standard of review and preservation is inapplicable.

See Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ,r 28, 368 P.3d 846 (explaining
that the general rule of retroactivity is one of "judicial policy rather than judicial
power" (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
KEY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
The following determinative statutes and ordinances are set forth in full in
the addendum:
Utah Code § 59-2-103 (2004) 3, Rate of assessment of property - Residential

property

The 2004 version applied during the relevant time frame, and it is the version the
County uses in this brief.

3
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Utah Code § 59-2-103.5 (2002)4, Procedures to obtain an exemption for

residential property
Utah Code 59-2-1004 (2007)s, Appeal to county board of equalization - Real

property - Time period for appeal - Decision of board - Extensions approved by
commission - Appeal to commission
Utah Code § 59-2-1321 (2017) 6 , Erroneous or illegal assessments - Deductions

and refunds
Utah Code § 59-2-1327 (2017), Payment of tax under protest - Circumstances

where authorized - Action to recover tax paid
Weber County Code§§ 6-14-1 et seq. (1985), Ordinance of Weber County Adopting

and Defining Procedures the County Treasurer Shall Utilize for Notification and
Refund of Real Property Tax Overpayments

[intentionally blank]

4 The section was amended in 2008 to reflect a changed citation to the Utah

Administrative Rulemaking Act. Because the change was not substantive, the
County refers throughout this brief to the 2002 version.
s The statute was amended in 2008, but the changes are immaterial to this analysis.
The County accordingly cites to the 2007 version in this brief.

Sections 59-2-1321 and 59-2-1327 remain unchanged since the relevant time
frame, so the County refers to the current versions in this brief.
6
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

In 2007, the county assessor flagged the Hammonses' property for
investigation into whether it was their primary residence and should be receiving
the residential exemption (a statutory provision requiring counties to reduce by
forty-five percent the fair market value used to assess residential properties,
limited to one primary residence per household). According to the County, the
assessor sent a letter asking the Hammonses to confirm that the property was their
primary residence, including a form called a "Signed Statement of Primary
Residence; Pursuant to Section: 59-2-103 and 59-2-307 UCA," but says it received
no response. (R.206; R.0465/33:8-34:20.) Lacking a response, the assessor did
not apply the residential exemption to the Hammonses' property in 2007 and
2008. (R.0033-0034.) The Hammonses paid taxes on the full value of their
residential property those years (R.0004-0005 at ,I122, 24, 35-36) without protest
and without initiating any formal process to challenge the assessments. (They
contend, however, that at some point they inquired into the issue via a telephone
call and were told by an unidentified county employee that the time to appeal the
valuations had run. (R.0005 at ,r,r 28-29.))
In early 2009, the Hammonses completed and submitted the assessor's
form. (R.0005 at ,r 32; R.0044-0045.) Upon receiving that confirmation, the

13
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assessor again began applying the residential exemption to the Hammonses'
property in 2009. (R.0035.)
The Hammonses took no action after that for almost three years, until fall
2012, when they sought a refund from the county assessor for the difference
between the taxes they paid on the full value of their property in 2007 and 2008
and the lesser amount they would have paid had the assessor applied the
residential exemption. (R.0006 at ,I 45.) The assessor denied their request
(R.0046-0048), and the Hammonses appealed that decision to the Weber County
Tax Review Committee (R.0006 at ,I 47). The committee heard the Hammonses'
appeal and recommended that the county commission deny their refund request.
Before the county commission, the Hammonses argued for the first time that
in 2007 and 2008 the county was barred from requiring them to provide a
verification that their home was their primary residence because at that time the
county had not passed an ordinance referenced in Utah Code § 59-2-103.5.
(R.0006 at ,I149-50.) That statute allowed a county to pass an ordinance requiring
a residential property owner to first file with the county board of equalization a
statement certifying that the property was a residence and containing other
information required by the Utah Tax Commission before receiving the residential
exemption. Utah Code § 59-2-103.5. If a county had not passed such an ordinance,
the statute provided that the board of equalization could not make the statement
an eligibility requirement for the exemption and was required to allow the
14
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exemption in accordance with the residential exemption statute, Utah Code

§

59-

2-103. Id.

The county comm1ss10n remanded that new issue for the tax review
committee to consider. (R.0007 at ,r 51.) The committee did, and again
recommended that the commission deny the Hammonses' refund request, which
it did. (R.0007 at ,r,r 52-53.) This suit followed.
The Course of Proceedings

This dispute has now gone through four levels of review: the county assessor,
the county tax review committee, the county commission, and the district court.
None has found in the Hammonses' favor.
The Hammonses brought their suit against not just the county and the
county commission, but also against the county commissioners (Jan Zogmaister,
Kerry Gibson, and Matthew Bell), the county assessor (John Ulibarri), and the
county clerk/auditor (Ricky Hatch) in their official and personal capacities.7 They
alleged ten causes of action, ranging from alleged violations of ordinances,
negligence, and unjust enrichment to fraud. (R.0001-0017.) The district court
disposed of the case through a series of rulings on three County motions.

When the lawsuit was filed, appellees Jan Zogmaister, Kerry Gibson, and
Matthew Bell were serving as the Weber County Commission. Mr. Gibson remains
a county commissioner. John Ulibarri was and remains the Weber County
Assessor, and Ricky Hatch was and remains the Weber County Clerk/Auditor.
7
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The district court dismissed several causes of action when it ruled on the
County's motion to dismiss (R.0166-0171), and enteredjudgment on the pleadings
on all but one of the remaining causes of action on the parties' subsequent crossmotions for judgment on the pleadings. (R.0429-0437.) That ruling provides the
basis for the Hammonses' appeal. They challenge the district court's ruling
granting the County judgment on the pleadings on the Hammonses' first three
causes of action, alleging that (1) denying them the residential exemption was
illegal, (2) not notifying them that they had consequently overpaid their property
taxes was illegal, and (3) not applying those overpaid taxes to the Hammonses'
subsequent tax bill was illegal. (R.0429-0437; 0007-0011 at ,I,I 57-86.)
The County thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings on the
Hammonses' sole remaining claim, for negligence, which the Hammonses did not
oppose. (R.0446-0447.) This appeal followed.
The Disposition Below

The district court granted the County judgment on the pleadings on the
Hammonses' first three causes of action. Regarding their first cause of action,
asserting that the county assessor acted illegally when he did not apply the
residential exemption to the Hammonses' property until they provided him with a
statement verifying that it was their primary residence, the district court held that
the county assessor's actions were legal. (R.0429-0437.) As for the Hammonses'
second and third causes of action, respectively alleging that the county illegally
16
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failed to notify them that they had overpaid their property taxes during the two
years the county did not apply the residential exemption and that it illegally failed
to apply those overpayments to the Hammonses' taxes, the district court held that
the county was under no obligation to do so because the Hammonses had not
timely appealed the county's withholding of the residential exemption under Utah
Code § 59-2-1004. (R.0429-0437.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL
Appellants Jesse and Alison Hammons own residential property in Liberty,
Weber County, Utah. (R.0004 at 116.) In 2007, the Weber County Assessor, noting
the owners' use of a post office box, flagged the Hammonses' property for
investigation as to whether it qualified for the residential exemption as their
primary residence. The assessor sent the Hammonses a letter asking them to verify
that the property was their primary residence, including a form called a "Signed
Statement of Primary Residence; Pursuant to Section: 59-2-103 and 59-2-307
UCA." The county assessor received no response. (R.0206; R.0465/33:8-34:20.)
The assessor thereafter valued the Hammonses' home at full market value,
and did not apply the residential exemption to reduce the amount it was assessed
in 2007 and 2008. The assessment notices the county sent to the Hammonses
showed that their home was being assessed at its full fair market value without the
residential exemption the county had previously applied, and notified them of their
deadline to appeal the valuation. (R.0004-0005 at ,r,r 20-22, 30; R.0033-0034 (the
17
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deadline is not visible on the portion of the copy of the 2008 notice the
Hammonses provided).) The Hammonses did not appeal the county's
assessments, and paid the full assessments without protest respectively on 29
November 2007 and 24 November 2008. (R.0039-40; R.0429-0437.)
The Hammonses allege that they called an unidentified county employee
about the issue and seeking a refund in 2007, but were told that their time to appeal

~

the assessment had expired. (R.0005 at ,r,r 28-29; R.0463124:11-25:9.) They
submitted an address change to someone at the county at some point in 2008.
(R.0005 at

,r

27.) When the Hammonses finally submitted the county's signed

statement form in 2009, they wrote on the form that the property had been their
primary residence since 2005. After receiving the executed signed statement form
from the Hammonses in 2009, the county assessor began applying the residential
exemption to their property again in 2009. (R.0005 at ,r,r 32-34, R.0044-0045.)
In 2007 and 2008, Weber County had not enacted the ordinance referenced
in section 59-2-103.5, requiring in certain circumstances property owners to first
apply to the board of equalization in order to receive a residential exemption.
(R.0005 at

,r

37; R.0055-0056.) The county passed such an ordinance in 2010,

which the Hammons contend was not published and of which they did not learn
until 2012. (R.0006 at ,r,r 43-44, 49.) The Hammonses filed this action on 12
August 2014. (Docket Index at 1.)

II
18
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ARGUMENT SUMMARY
The Hammonses brought their claims too late. Their refund claims under
Utah Code § 59-2-1321 ("section 1321") are subject to a four-year statute of
limitations measured from when the taxes were paid. Here, the taxes at issue were
paid in November 2007 and 2008, but the Hammonses did not bring this action
until August 2014. Neither the county code nor the discovery rule operate to avoid
the claims' untimeliness. The county code merely puts in place procedures to effect
refunds under section 1321. And the discovery rule is not available because there
was no concealment or estoppel and no evidence that the Hammonses did not
know or could not reasonably have known of their claims before the four years
expired.
Even if the Hammonses' section 1321 claims were timely, they would
nonetheless fail because the alleged illegal and erroneous collections on which they
are based do not fit within section 1321's scope. They are not clearly illegal or
erroneous from contemporaneous county records. The Hammonses should have
instead challenged the assessments under Utah Code§ 59-2-1004 ("section 1004")
or paid them under protest and brought their claims under Utah Code § 59-2-1327
("section 1327").
If the Court finds that the Hammonses' claims are both timely and properly

within section 1321's ambit, the collections still were not illegal. County assessors
are authorized to investigate whether residences within their counties qualify for
19
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the residential exemption and, if they believe a property does not qualify for the
exemption, are not required to apply the exemption when valuing the property.
The legislature's enactment of Utah Code § 59-2-103.5 ("section 103.5") did not
alter that authority, and the ordinance it requires a county to pass if the county
wishes to require its citizens to apply for the residential exemption addresses
applications to the board of equalization, not questions about whether a property
owner continues to qualify for an exemption.
Finally, if the Court rules against the County on any of these issues, the
County requests that it limit its opinion's retroactive effect to this suit. Such a
decision would change the law upon which Weber County has reasonably relied,
and it would create an undue burden by opening the county to claims for refunds
of taxes that have already been collected, budgeted, and spent on county services.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Hammonses' claims are untimely under section 1321 because
they did not bring them within four years of paying the taxes at
issue. (responding to Point III of the Hammonses' brief, pages 28-30)

Assuming that the Hammonses' claims fit within section 1321's scope, as
they contend (Aplts.' Br. at 28-30), their claims are barred because they were not
brought within four years from when the taxes at issue were paid. The Hammonses
allege they overpaid and seek a refund for taxes collected in 2007 and 2008. But
they did not commence this suit until 2014. The Hammonses cannot salvage their
claims by relying on county ordinance that merely set forth procedures for making
20
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refunds under section 1321, or by resorting the discovery rule when there was no
concealment or estoppel and the Hammonses were aware of their claims well
before the limitation period expired.
The part of section 1321 relevant here allows a county to order any taxes paid
more than once, or erroneously or illegally collected, refunded: "Any taxes,
interest, and costs paid more than once, or erroneously or illegally collected, may,
by order of the county legislative body, be refunded by the county treasurer, .... "
Utah Code§ 59-2-1321. That language has undergone only minor changes during
the last century. Compare Utah Code § 59-2-1321 (2017) with Utah Comp. Laws §
2642 (1907).

This Court addressed that statutory language at length in Neilson v. San Pete
County, 123 P. 334 (Utah 1912). The Court explained that the section allowed,

under narrow circumstances, a taxpayer a private right of action for a refund even
when the taxpayer did not pay the disputed tax under protest, as required for an
action under the precursor to what is now section Utah Code§ 59-2-1327. Neilson,
123 P. at 338-39. Although the Court agreed that section 1321 nee section 2642

required a taxpayer to "demand or request" a refund from the county, id. at 338,
the Court rejected the argument that the demand or request must be a formally
filed claim "done as a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action," id.
The Court could not "see why more than a mere demand to refund is necessary to
protect the county," id., and held that "a demand in writing" for the return of the
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taxes was "all that [wa]s necessary," id. at 340, not a "formal or verified claim," id.
at 339-40.

If the county refused to order a refund, the taxpayer could then "bring an
action to recover the tax." Id. at 340. The Court characterized such a suit as "an
ordinary action as for money had and received," id. at 339, and applied the
corresponding catchall four-year statute of limitations (then codified as Utah
Comp. Laws § 2883 (1907)), but stopped short of deciding whether the limitation
period started when the tax was paid or when the refund was demanded "because
this question is not raised nor necessary to the decision of this case." Id. at 340.
Nearly thirty years later, the Court answered that question in Wilson v.

Weber County, 111 P.2d 147 (Utah 1941), overruled on other grounds by Shea v.
State Tax Comm'n, 120 P.2d 274 (Utah 1941). The Court held there that the fouryear statute of limitations for section 1321 claims (which by then had been
renumbered to R.S.U. § 80-10-17 (1933)) runs from when the tax is paid.
The plaintiff, Wilson, cross-appealed a lower court's ruling sustaining Weber
County's demurrer to two causes of action because they were barred by the fouryear statute oflimitations. Id. at 148. Wilson contended that the limitation period
for a section 1321 claim began to run from the demand, and that the demand had
to be made within a "reasonable time after payment," which he argued was also
four years. Id. The Court rejected that approach. Where a plaintiff states a section
1321 action ("the illegality of the collection has been determined, it is an
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involuntary payment, the amount is liquidated, and is capable of exact proof from
the records"), the demand "is part of the remedy and not part of the cause of action
and it must be made or given, and the action must be filed, both within the
statutory period from the date of payment." Id. at 150.
The Court's conclusion is consistent with the majority of courts addressing
the topic. When a statute requires a claimant to make a demand, "but apparently
does not require any substantial delay after" making the demand, "the majority of
the courts hold that the requirement for presentation or notice does not affect the
running of the statute of limitation. In such cases the reasoning is that the
requirement is merely a part of the remedy and not an essential part of the cause
of action." M.L. Cross, Annotation, Limitation Period as Affected by Requirement

of Notice or Presentation of Claim against Government Body, 3 A.L.R.2d 711 § 2
(2017). See also 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 133 (2017) (advising
similarly that, if the statute requiring the demand does not also prescribe a delay
after the demand is made, "and no legal requirement prevents the claimant from
perfecting the right to sue immediately," the limitations period starts as soon as
the claimant may make the demand, "rather than on the day he or she actually does
so").
For over seventy-five years, therefore, a four-year limitation period running
from the date of payment has applied to section 1321 claims. The Hammonses
might argue that the procedures Weber County adopted by ordinance to govern
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refunding double and erroneous and illegal collections under section 1321
somehow extend that period. But such an argument would fail for at least two
reasons.
First, Weber County's ordinances plainly were not intended to extend the
limitations period applied to section 1321 claims. They rather reflect the county's
effort simply "[t]o adopt procedures ... for the refund of real property tax
overpayments" under section 1321. Weber County Code § 6-14-2 (1985). 8 The
ordinances assume that the truces collected fall within section 1321's scope, i.e., are
redundant payments or were erroneously or illegally collected within the statute's
narrow application (see below, part II). Built onto that foundational assumption
are the procedures for refunding such improper collections: the treasurer9 is to
make a good faith effort to notify the trucpayer when she or he discovers such taxes
have been collected, Weber County Code § 6-14-3 (1985); if a taxpayer requests a
refund of such payments, the treasurer is to pay it in a timely manner, Weber
County Code§ 6-14-4 (1985); if the treasurer does not refund such payments by
August 15 of the year following their collection, the treasurer must apply them

The County includes the applicable ordinances in the addendum. They have since
been renumbered in nearly identical form as Weber County Ordinances§§ 2-11-1
et seq. (2013).
8

One of the few county elected officials the Hammonses did not name as a
defendant.

9
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against the current year's truces, Weber County Code§ 6-14-5 (1985). None of those
procedures mentions a limitation period.
The closest any of the ordinances comes to addressing a timing limitation is
section 6-14-4's provision requiring the treasurer to apply payments against the
current year's true bill if they have not been refunded by August 15 the year
following payment. That provision nonetheless says nothing about a limitation on
bringing actions under section 1321, much less indefinitely extending the
limitation period. If anything, section 6-14-4 would shorten, not lengthen, the time
to bring a claim because it requires the treasurer to apply payments that are not
refunded by August 15 of the year following the payments "against the current

years [sic] real property true," Weber County Code § 6-14-5 (1985) (emphasis
added), i.e., against the truces for the year following the payments. Without a clear
indication that Weber County intended to alter the limitations period set by state
statute, there is no need to address whether the county could change the time
limitation to bring a section 1321 claim.
But even assuming Weber County's ordinances actually attempted to extend
the limitations period, they would be invalid because they would conflict with, and
be preempted by, state statutes. "It is well established that, where a city ordinance
is in conflict with a state statute, the ordinance is invalid at its inception." Hansen

v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, ,r 15, 116 P .3d 290. An ordinance that permits '"that which
the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa"' "'is in conflict with general laws."'
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Id. (quoting Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671, 673 (Utah 1938)). "Also, an
ordinance is invalid if it intrudes into an area which the Legislature has preempted
by comprehensive legislation intended to blanket a particular field." State v.

Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Utah 1980). Interpreting the county's ordinances
to extend the limitations period would conflict with the four-year limitation set by
section 1321 and Utah Code§ 78B-2-307 (2017) 10 (setting the four-year limitation).
That interpretation would also intrude into the comprehensive state legislation
governing limitations periods and taxation, and would therefore be preempted.
Each county does not get to set its own limitations period for a taxpayer to bring a
section 1321 action.
The statute of limitation applicable to the Hammonses' claim, if properly
brought under section 1321, is therefore four years from the date they paid the
taxes at issue. The Hammonses made the payments at issue on 29 November 2007
and 24 November 2008, but they did not file suit until 12 August 2014, nearly two
years too late to challenge even the most recent payment.
The Hammonses might attempt to argue that their time to bring their action
was tolled because, although they changed their address with the county in 2008
and submitted the verification the assessor sought in 2009, which included a

Although it has been renumbered several times, the language at issue has
remained essentially unchanged since before Neilson.

10
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handwritten note that the home had been their primary residences since 2005, the
county did not notify them that they had made an illegal or erroneous payment
under Weber County Code§ 6-14-3 (1985). That argument, however, suffers from
several flaws. First, the County is unaware of any evidence that either of the
Hammonses' changes of address, assuming they could be interpreted as notices
that they made illegal or erroneous payments in 2007 and 2008 (see infra, pt. II)
were delivered to the treasurer, who is the county officer the ordinance charges
with giving the notice. And, as just explained, the ordinance cannot change the
applicable statute of limitation. Moreover, because all the Hammonses did was
inform the county of their address change and that the home was their primary
residence, the notices do not amount to section 1321 demands. And even if they
did, they would not affect the limitation period, which runs from the date of
payment.
Such an argument would be essentially an invocation of the discovery rule.
But the Hammonses' change of address and verification form do not amount to
concealment by the county. See Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,I 26,
108 P.3d 741 (describing concealment version of discovery rule). Nor could the
Hammonses argue that they did not know and could not reasonably have known
of their claim without the treasurer's notice, as required to assert the extraordinary
circumstances version of the rule. See O'Neal v. Div. of Family Servs., 821 P.2d
1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) ("[T]o invoke the exceptional-circumstances version of the
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discovery rule, the plaintiff must make a threshold showing that he or she did not
know and could not know and could not reasonably have known of the existence
of a cause of action."). The county's valuation notices showed that the residential
exemption was not being applied, and the Hammonses' submission of their
address change and their verification demonstrates that they knew they were being
assessed more than they thought they should.
The Hammonses might also attempt to rely on their alleged telephone call
with unidentified county personnel in 2008 wherein they claim they were told that
their time to appeal the assessment had expired. There is no indication that the

@

employee took affirmative steps intended to deceive the Hammonses. (In fact,
depending on the call's timing, the employee might have correctly indicated that
the time to appeal the assessment under section 1004-which allows appeals from
the later of September 15 or forty-five days after the assessment notice-had
expired. Utah Code § 59-2-1004(2)(a).) The alleged representation from an
unidentified employee during a telephone call was also insufficient to estop the
county. The concealment version of the discovery rule "'is essentially a claim of
equitable estoppel."' Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, ,r 26 (quoting Warren v. Provo

Cit:y Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah 1992)). And it is "very difficult to estop
the government. Only 'well-substantiated representations' by a governmental
entity will suffice. To estop a governmental entity, its representations must
generally take the form of a written statement by an authorized person." Bischel v.
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Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (Bench, J., dissenting) (quoting
Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992)) (citations
omitted). A telephone call with an unidentified employee who potentially thought
she or he was giving the correct answer does not provide a basis for the
concealment version of the discovery rule.
Finally, the Hammonses might argue that the concealment version of the
discovery rule applies to their claims because they did not become aware until 2012
that the county enacted the ordinance they assert was necessary before anyone at
the county could request a signed statement from them verifying that they
qualified for the residential exemption. They allege that the county concealed that
it had passed such an ordinance because it was not timely published on the
county's website. Although it might be true that the ordinance's enactment
prompted the Hammonses to raise their argument, their contention is based on
the ordinance's absence when the county assessor sought to verify that their home
was their primary residence. Its passage had no effect, and neither did any delay in
publishing it to the county website-they still raised the argument when they
demanded a refund and before filing suit. (R.0006-07 at ,r,r 50-53.)
A party asserting the concealment version of the discovery rule must show

that it "has acted in a reasonable and diligent manner. In order to meet this
reasonableness standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate that, 'given the defendant's
actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory
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period."' Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, ,I 26 (citations omitted) (quoting Warren,
838 P.2d at 1130). Having been notified that the exemption was no longer being
applied to their property and being aware enough to inquire about the taxes to the
county, it was not reasonable for the Hammonses to pay without protest and wait
more than four years to bring their claims.
At least insofar as the Hammonses' 2008 payment is concerned, their pre-

@

25 October 2012 demand should be convincing evidence that, particularly for that
claim, they were well aware of it within the four years they had to bring their action.
Yet they failed to do so for nearly another two years.
II.

If the Hammonses' claims were timely under section 1321, it would
not matter because they do not fall within its scope and should
have been brought under section 1004 or section 1327. (responding
to Point III of the Hammonses' brief, pages 28-30)
The Hammonses argue that, under section 1321, they are entitled to refunds

of the taxes the county collected on their home in 2007 and 2008 in excess of what
they would have paid had the county assessor applied the residential exemption.
They assert that their 2007 and 2008 payments constitute the illegal or erroneous
payments addressed section 1321. Their desire to place them under section 1321 is
understandable, since under section 1004 they must follow an administrative
process under tight time constraints with which they did not comply, and under
Utah Code § 59-2-1327 ("section 1327") they must have paid the taxes under
protest, which they did not do. But to fall within section 1321's scope, the payments
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must be clearly illegal or erroneous based on county documents at the time, which
does not describe the Hammonses' payments. Instead, they should have
challenged the alleged overpayments via section 1004 or, barring that approach,
by paying under protest and bringing an action under section 1327. Because they
did neither, they have waived their claims.
To state a claim under section 1321, the over-assessment or overpayment at
issue, whether because it was redundant, erroneous, or illegal, must have been
obvious at the time it was assessed or paid. In Neilson, the illegality of the taxes at
issue was undisputed: the county had levied taxes on mortgages despite a
constitutional amendment that exempted mortgages from taxation. Neilson, 123
P. at 335-36, 340. The Court explained that, while taxes challenged under what is

now section 1327 address taxes deemed unlawful by the taxpayer but not
necessarily by the tax collector, in contrast a claim under section 1321 "does not
deal with any such taxes or demands. The taxes mentioned in that section are such
only which it is clear the county had no authority to collect, and, in case they are
collected, has no legal right to retain them." Id. at 338. "Whether a tax has been
twice paid or erroneously or illegally collected usually is, and always should be, a
matter of record in the county treasurer's office if he has complied with the law."

Id.
In Wilson, the Court elaborated that, while the payment-under-protest
statute "is applicable if the validity of the particular statute in question is yet to be
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determined," what is now section 1321 "is applicable to the case when the validity
of the statute requiring payment is not in question, but is assumed to be invalid. In
other words, the illegality of the payment is unquestioned." Wilson, 111 P.2d at 149.
But in Wilson the Court held that the plaintiff stated a claim under section
1321's precursor for taxes paid before an intervening decision invalidated the
portion of a statute under which they were collected. The Court reasoned that its

@

decision rendered the statute void ab initio, which in turn meant that the tax
payments were illegal. Id. at 149. That conclusion drew a partial dissent by two
justices, who argued that whether a claim can be stated under what is now section
1321 must be evaluated at the time the tax was assessed or collected. They asserted
that section 1321 "deals with a situation where there is no color of warrant for the
assessment-a failure to follow law resulting in an erroneous or double assessment
where even by any purported law, no tax as paid was due." Id. at 150 (Wolfe and
McDonough, JJ., dissenting in part). "If the statute is invalid of course [the tax
collector] has acted without warrant of law but not without color of warrant." Id.
According to the dissenters, "only taxes collected without color of warrant by
entirely extra-legal action, in contradistinction to those collected by color of
warrant which by apparent law the officer was required to collect, are covered by
[section 1321]." Id. at 151. Thus, "the Neilson case did not hold that taxes collected
illegally but by color of warrant of law could be recovered by suit under [section
1321]. Its language seem to import just the opposite-viewed in light of the facts."
32
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Id. at 150-51. In other words, section 1321 actions were for taxes collected under

statutes that had already been voided when they were collected, not under statutes
that were only subsequently invalidated.
A few months later, the dissenting justices appear to have persuaded their
colleagues. In Shea v. State Tax Commission, 120 P.2d 274 (Utah 1941), the Court
was again presented with a case where the plaintiff sought a refund for taxes paid
without protest under a statute later held unconstitutional. Id. at 274-75. In
affirming the district court's decision refusing to order a refund, the Court held
that section 1321's predecessor applied "only to collections which the officials could
themselves have determined at the time of collection that they should not collect,
such determination to be made as a matter of fact and not as a matter of law." Id.
at 276. "In cases in which legality or illegality of tax sought to be recovered by
taxpayer necessarily involves determination of questions oflaw calling for exercise
of strictly judicial functions, payment under protest and compliance with other
provisions of the statutes afford the exclusive remedy." Id. at 275. The Court
explicitly overruled Wilson to the extent it held that a plaintiff could seek a refund
for taxes paid without protest because the statute they were paid under was
subsequently invalidated. Id. at 276.
This Court confirmed that holding in CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State Tax

Commission, 897 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1995), where it affirmed a district court's
decision that the taxpayer was not entitled to a refund of ad valorem taxes when its
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net revenues were adjusted downward in light of a decision made by a federal
regulatory agency. Id. at 1214-15. Relying on its previous holdings that "events
occurring subsequent to the collection of a tax do not render the collection
erroneous," id. at 1216, n.

2,

the Court held that the taxes were not erroneously or

illegally collected as required to state a claim under section 1321, id. at 1216. The
Court explained that the Property Tax Act left "no room for us to hold that a
taxpayer is entitled to a refund of taxes which were paid on the basis of a valuation
that was correct as of a given January 1st but which would have been different had
the assessor known of a subsequent state of facts." Id.
Section 1321, therefore, has a "relatively narrow" scope. Woodbury

Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 28, ,r 9, 73 P.3d 362. In Woodbury,
the Court affirmed the dismissal of the taxpayers' section 1321 claims. The
taxpayers, a group of landlords, asserted that they were being assessed more than
once for leasehold improvements because the county assessed their tenants
personal property tax on the improvements and assessed them real property taxes
based on the improved property's value. Id. ,r 3. The landlords brought their suit
soon after a tax commission rule change that required leasehold improvements to
be assessed to the property owner as a part of the underlying property's value. The
commission said that it intended the amendment in part to "'reduce and eliminate
the double assessment of leasehold improvements."' Id. ,I 6. In affirming the
district court's dismissal, the Court found that the assessments did not fit within
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section 1321's redundant payment clause because that referred to payments by the
same taxpayer. Id. ,r 18. The Court also held that the landlords' claims were not
based on erroneous or illegal collections under section 1321 because they did "not
allege an error of fact or law that would be readily apparent from county records,"
but rather challenged the county assessors' methodology. Id. ,r 19.
"The legislative scheme clearly contemplates that the primary vehicle for
challenging property tax assessments is the administrative appeals process laid out
in section 59-2-1004." Id. ,r 14. The PropertyTaxActmandates "that taxpayers who
dispute the valuation of their property take their claim to the board under Utah
Code section 59-2-1004 within the prescribed time period or waive it." Id. ,r 15. If
waived, the taxpayer "may still pay the tax under protest if he disputes the legality
of the tax and wishes to bring suit in district court under Utah Code section 59-21327." Id. Finally, if the taxpayer waives administrative review under section 1004
and fails to pay under protest as required for a section 1327 challenge, "in the
limited circumstance where a taxpayer can point to an error of fact or law in the
collection of the tax, or a payment more than once, that is readily apparent from
county records, he may apply to the commission to refund the mistakenly collected
amount under" section 1321 and bring an action if the commission denies the
application. Id. But, "[i]f the illegality is in dispute, the taxpayer must first pay
under protest before he has standing to challenge the tax in court under section
59-2-1327." Id. ,r 12.
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The Hammonses assert that the county illegally and erroneously collected
taxes from them by failing to apply the residential exemption both because the
assessor was not legally authorized to withhold the exemption and because the
county's position that their home was not their primary residence was mistaken.
The district court held that the assessor was legally authorized to deny the
exemption and implicitly found that the Hammonses' factual challenge to the
county's decision that their home did not qualify for the residential exemption as
their primary residence did not rise to the type of erroneous collection covered by
section 1321 when it held that challenge was barred under section 1004. The
district court was correct that the Hammonses' challenge based on their home's
qualification did not fall within section 1321's scope and it did not have to analyze
the assessor's authority because that question also did not rise to level necessary
for a section 1321 challenge.
The error in law the Hammonses allege here does not rise to the illegality
required for a section 1321 challenge. The Hammonses claim that the county
assessor lacked statutory authority to withhold the residential exemption from the
Hammonses' property when he did not receive the verification he requested to
confirm that the home was their primary residence. They base their position on
their interpretation of section 103.5 as prohibiting any county officer or
department from requesting verification that a home qualifies for the exemption
unless the county has enacted an ordinance requiring property owners to apply for
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the residential exemption. The County, however, disagrees with the Hammonses'
reading of section

103.5,

and contends that the county assessor is authorized to

investigate whether properties qualify for the residential exemption and to not
apply it if unconvinced. See infra, pt. III. This dispute about how to interpret the
applicable statutes is not the clear legal error required for a section 1321 challenge.
As the Court explained in Shea, where the "legality or illegality of tax sought

to be recovered by taxpayer necessarily involves determination of questions of law
calling for exercise of strictly judicial functions, payment under protest and
compliance with other provisions of the statutes afford the exclusive remedy." Shea
at

275.

The Hammonses' claim of legal error here is not like the one made in

Neilson, where the Court had invalidated the statute at issue before the taxes were
assessed and collected. In fact, here the collection has been upheld as legal now by
the county assessor, the county's tax review committee, the county commission,
and the district court. Under the circumstances, the legal error the Hammonses
allege is not the clear error section 1321 is meant to address.
The Hammonses also assert their section 1321 challenge based on what they
allege is a clear factual error: that contrary to the assessor's determination, their
home was indeed their primary residence in

2007

and

2008.

But that was not

readily apparent from county records at the time the taxes were collected, as
required for a section 1321 claim.
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The Hammonses allege that they called someone at the county about the
issue in 2007. But the county's records at that time indicated that it had sent out a
request for verification that the home was the Hammonses' primary residence and
received nothing in return. Their call was contrary to the county's records. In fact,
their call indicates that the Hammonses had been alerted by the county's notice
that the exemption had been removed and therefore could have timely challenged
the truces under section 1004 or paid under protest.
Next, the Hammonses assert that they submitted an address change (from a
post office box to the home's physical address) to someone at the county at some
point in

2008.

Again, even assuming the address change was submitted to the

assessor or the treasurer, the county's records still indicated that the Hammonses
had not returned a verification that the home was their primary residence. It was
not readily apparent from the county's records that it had withheld the residential
exemption in error. (And, again, the Hammonses could have challenged the
assessment under section 1004 or paid under protest.)
Finally, the Hammonses also base their claim on a handwritten note they
included on the verification form they submitted to the county in 2009, stating that
the property had been their primary residence since

2005.

But that note did not

create a county record from which it could be readily ascertained that the
Hammonses had made erroneous payments in

2007

and

2008.

The county

employee receiving the form would have had to surmise from the note that the
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•
Hammonses had made payments in 2007 and 2008 on the full value of their home
and that they had not appealed those payments, which the employee could not do
without further investigation. It would not be clear. Even assuming that the note
was sufficient to alert the county that the Hammonses' 2007 and 2008 payments
were erroneous, the note itself came after the payments, meaning that according
to county records at the time of the payments, the Hammonses had not responded
to the county's request that they verify the home was their primary residence. At
best, the Hammonses' statement confirming that the property was their primary
residence merely informed the County of what the trial court correctly termed "two
potentially erroneous assessments." (R.0433.) Section 1321 is not so broad. If it
were, it would greatly increase the county's workload to include monitoring and
investigating every communication from a third party that could affect its tax
liability, and would therefore expose the county to significantly increased risk.
The Hammonses' challenge to the assessor's decision to withhold the
residential exemption from his assessment of their property in 2007 and 2008 is
essentially a question about valuation, and as such was best suited for a challenge
under section 1004. Utah Code § 59-2-1004(1)(a) (allowing taxpayers to appeal
their valuations or equalizations to the board of equalization). When the county
assessor withheld the residential exemption from the Hammonses' property, the
result was that their property was assessed at full value, rather than forty-five
percent less than full value (the amount of the household exemption). The
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overpayment the Hammonses allege, therefore, resulted from an erroneous
valuation.
The Hammonses could have appealed the county assessor's valuation of
their property under section 1004. The assessment notice they received explained
how they could have brought that appeal. They did not, however, take advantage
of that process. Nor did they pay their taxes on the full value of their property under

@

protest, which would have qualified them to raise their challenge under section
1327. Because their 2007 and 2008 payments do not constitute the illegal or

erroneous collections covered by section 1321, they have waived their ability to
challenge those collections, regardless whether they were timely.
III.

Alternatively, even if the Hammons es' claims are timely and
properly brought under section 1321, the county assessor's
actions were not illegal because he acted within his authority.
(responding to Points I and II of the Hammonses' brief, pages 16-27)

In their complaint, the Hammonses based the three claims at issue on their
theory that the county could not deny them the residential exemption if it had not
passed the ordinance authorized by section 103.5. (R.0008 at ,I,I 63-64 (alleging in
their first cause of action that the county "had no statutory authority" to deny the
Hammonses the exemption because it had not passed the ordinance), R.00080009 at ,r,I 68-69, 71-74 (asserting that, because the county lacked authority to

withhold the exemption without the ordinance, the Hammonses' full payments
were actually overpayments of which the county was legally bound to notify them),
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R.0010 at ,r,r 78-84 (similarly contending that without the ordinance the county
could not withhold the exemption, meaning that the Hammonses overpaid and
that they should have received a tax credit for their overpayments).) But the county
assessor's authority to investigate properties to determine whether they qualify for
the residential exemption and to withhold that exemption if they do not was not
affected by section 103.5's enactment.
A.

Elected county assessors are and were statutorily authorized, and
likely required, to determine whether a property qualifies for a
residential exemption.

County assessors are elected and statutorily required to assess the fair
market value of private property within a county to determine the amount of
property tax to be charged those properties, including whether the value for certain
residential property should be reduced under Utah's residential exemption.
Assessors are correspondingly also statutorily empowered to investigate whether
a property qualifies for the residential exemption.
Utah Code § 59-2-301 11 requires county assessors to "assess all property
located within the county which is not required by law to be assessed by the [tax]
commission." Id. By its plain language, therefore, assessors are required, with an
exception inapplicable here, "to estimate officially the value ... as a basis for
taxation" of all property within their counties. Webster's Encyclopedic

The statute remains unchanged from the relevant time, so the County uses the
current version here.
11
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Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 125 (Gramercy Books 1996)
(defining "assess").
Utah Code§ 59-2-103 ("section 103") required at the relevant time (and still
requires) that "[a]ll tangible taxable property" "be assessed ... at a uniform and
equal rate on the basis of its fair market value . . . unless otherwise provided by
law." Utah Code§ 59-2-103(1). In the immediately succeeding subsection, the law
otherwise provided: the fair market value of residential property was to be reduced
by forty-five percent, but only for one primary residence per household (and "[n]o
more than one acre ofland per residential unit"). Utah Code § 59-2-103(2)-(4).
Because the county assessor is charged with the duty to assess county
property, and because residential property should be assessed at forty-five percent
less than fair market value, but only for one primary residence per household, the
county assessor must determine whether the residential property being assessed
satisfies the requirements for the residential exemption. See State v. Barrett, 127
P.3d 682, 689 (Utah 2005) (explaining that Utah courts "read the plain language
of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters" (citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
The Hammonses' argument that assessors were statutorily empowered to do
nothing more than establish fair market value and verify ownership (R.248-250,
0253-0254) imposes too narrow a reading. A fair reading of the governing statutes
42
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reveals that assessors were charged with assessing properties as the law instructed,
including applying the residential exemption to only qualifying properties. The
assessor is in the best position to confirm that the properties receiving the
exemption qualify for it.
Other Property Tax Act sections applicable during the relevant time make
the county assessor's authority to determine whether a property qualified for the
residential exemption more explicit. Because county assessors had to (and still
must) assess residential property at a reduced rate, but only if the property
qualifies as a primary residence, it follows that county assessors would be
authorized to investigate whether a property qualifies for the exemption. Utah
Code §§ 59-2-306 and -307 empowered assessors to do just that. Utah Code § 592-306(1) (2000 ) 12 authorized an assessor to "request a signed statement from any
person setting forth all the real . . . property assessable by the assessor which is
owned, possessed, managed, or under the control of the person .... " That signed
statement "shall include" "all property belonging to, claimed by, or in the
possession, control, or management of the person." Utah Code § 59-2-306(3)(a).
The act also authorized assessors to "subpoena and examine any person ...
in relation to any signed statement." Utah Code§ 59-2-306(4). People who refused

The section was amended in 2008 to add more specific dates and deadlines, but
the substance relied upon here did not change. The County therefore uses the 2000
version throughout this brief.
12
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to file the signed statement requested by the assessor, including "with respect to
name and place of residence," were subject to statutory penalty. Utah Code § 59-2307(1) (2006) 13.
When read together, sections 59-2-306 and 59-2-307 demonstrate the
assessor's authority to investigate whether a property qualifies for the residential
exemption.
The Tax Commission appears to have interpreted assessors' authority like
the County did because its contemporary administrative rules authorized assessors
to make such determinations in similar situations. For example, the commission's
rules allowed a property to qualify for the residential exemption while under
construction "[i]f the county assessor determine[d]" that it would qualify when
completed. Utah Admin. Code § R884-24P-52(F)(3) (2007) 14. The rules similarly
also allowed an unoccupied property to qualify "[i]f the county assessor
determine[d]" that it would qualify once occupied. Utah Admin. Code§ R884-24P52(F)(6). It would be inconsistent with a prohibition on assessors' ability to
determine whether a home continues to qualify for the residential exemption to

The section was amended in 2008, but because those amendments are
immaterial to the issue posed by the Hammonses' appeal, the County refers
throughout this brief to the 2006 version.
13

The rule was subsequently amended during the relevant time frame, but the cited
provisions remained unchanged.
14
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authorize those same assessors to determine whether unoccupied homes and
homes under construction will qualify.
The Hammonses' reference to Summit County's current residential
exemption ordinance (Aplts.' Br. at 20-21) is inapposite to interpreting the law
applicable to Weber County approximately eight years ago. The County does note,
however, that even under Summit County's ordinance, property owners are
required to initially provide evidence that their property qualifies for the
exemption to the county assessor, and explicitly authorizes the county assessor to
investigate. (R.0319-0327 at Summit County Ord. 1-12B-1(A) & (D).)

B.

The county assessor's authority to investigate whether a property
qualified for the residential exemption and to withhold the exemption
if the property did not qualify did not depend on the county's adoption
of the ordinance referenced in section 103.5.

The state legislature did not modify county assessors' authority when it
enacted section 103.5. That section only limited the circumstances under which
residential property owners had to apply to their boards of equalization for the
residential exemption before receiving it. Before section 103.5's enactment, all
residential property owners first had to apply for the exemption to their county
boards of equalization. After the statute's enactment, property owners no longer
had to apply for the exemption unless their counties had passed an ordinance
requiring an application and the property fell within one of three specified
classifications. Section 103.5's 2002 enactment did not alter the exemption's
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limitation in section 103 to "[n]o more than one acre of land per residential unit"
(the primary residence requirement was added effective 2005), nor did it address,
and therefore did not change, county assessors' statutory authority to investigate
whether properties qualified for the exemption, including the power to request
information related to ownership and residency.
Section 103.5 required county boards of equalization to allow property

@

owners the residential exemption for their qualifying properties without having to
file an application "on a form prescribed by the [tax] commission" and including
"information as required by the [tax] commission," unless the county had passed
an ordinance requiring property owners to apply for the exemption. Id. If a county
had passed such an ordinance, the application was required if the property fell into
one of three categories: (1) the property was not eligible for the exemption the
previous year; (2) the property's ownership had changed; or (3) the board of
equalization believed the property no longer qualified. Id.
Before the state legislature enacted section 103.5 in 2002, all property
owners seeking the residential exemption had to apply for it to their county boards
of equalization under Utah Code§ 59-2-1102(3) (2000) ("No reduction may be
made in the value of property and no exemption may be granted unless the party
affected ... makes and files with the board [of equalization] a written application
for the reduction or exemption, .... "), which remains the case for some other types
of exemptions. See, e.g., Utah Code § 59-2-1102(3)-(11) (2015); see also A.E., Inc.
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v. Summit County Comm'n, 2001 UT App 322, ,r,r 9-11, 35 P.3d 1153 (affirming
denial of the residential exemption because the property owner had not applied for
it under section 59-2-1102(3) (2000)).
Section 103.5 therefore carved out the residential exemption from section
59-2-1102's requirement that property owners first had to apply for an exemption
to the board of equalization. Instead, section 103.5 (passed the year following A.E.)
required counties to pass an ordinance if they wished to continue that application
requirement. The ordinance would require property owners to provide their local
boards of equalization a statement meeting certain criteria in order to ''be allowed
a residential exemption," Utah Code§ 59-2-103.5, but otherwise prohibited boards
of equalization from requiring one. Section 103.5, however, did not abrogate
section 103's limitation on residential exemptions to one acre of land per
residential unit. In other words, just because a county had not adopted an
ordinance requiring property owners to apply for the residential exemption did not
mean that every property owner within that county could characterize her or his
property as residential and automatically received the exemption, regardless
whether it really was residential or limited to one acre as required at the time by
section 59-2-103(3) (2002).
Section 103.5 repeatedly and explicitly reiterated that it was subordinate to
section 103. It enjoined boards of equalization to allow the residential exemption
in counties without ordinances requiring applications "in accordance with Section
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59-2-103" (i.e., still limited to one acre of land per residential unit and, later, a
single primary residence per household). Utah Code § 59-2-103.5(3)(b).
The interplay between sections 103, 103.5, 59-2-301, 59-2-306, and 59-2-

@

307, read harmoniously as they must, described a system in which, unless a county
passed an ordinance requiring otherwise, property owners no longer had to apply
to the board of equalization for the residential exemption. Instead, their residential

@

properties would automatically receive the exemption, so long as they qualified.
The county assessor assessed qualifying properties (i.e., properties that were
residences and, as of 2005, served as a household's primary residence) at fifty-five
percent of their fair market values (i.e., applying a forty-five percent reduction). If
the assessor was unsure about a property's status, the assessor could investigate,
including seeking a signed statement and even exercising subpoena power to
examine the property owner. And if the assessor did not apply the exemption, the
property owner could challenge that decision by appealing to the board of
equalization under Utah Code § 59-2-1004(1)(a) ("A taxpayer dissatisfied with the
valuation or the equalization of the taxpayer's real property may make an
application to appeal .... ").
Because section 103.5 did not modify the county assessor's obligation to
apply the residential exemption only to qualifying properties or his authority to
investigate whether a property qualified for the exemption, his investigation
whether the Hammonses' property was their primary residence, particularly by
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requesting a signed statement confirming as much under his section 59-2-307
authority (the section the assessor's own form cited (R.0005 at ,r,r31-32, 34;

•

Roo44-0045)) 15, was legal.
The Hammonses, however and in contrast to the County's harmonizing
approach, view section 103.5 as an unrestricted tax break for all property that an
owner can characterize as residential and that prohibited counties from even
inquiring whether a property qualified for the residential exemption under section
103 unless they passed an ordinance that allowed their boards of equalization to
ask for the statement the statute described (under limited circumstances). That
reading ignores section 103.5's historical context and would render section 103's
restrictions inoperative.
That the Hammonses' interpretation would render section 103's residential
exemption limitations inoperative becomes clear when considering a hypothetical
residential property that is not the owners' primary residence. If the county in
which that property is situated did not pass an ordinance requiring a statement
under section 103.5, the Hammonses' view would mean that the property owners
would nonetheless automatically receive the exemption. But because the county

s As opposed to using "a form prescribed by the [tax] commission." Utah Code§

1

59-2-103.5. The current version of that form, "Application for Residential Property
Exemption (UC 59-2-103 and 59-2-10[3].5)," can be found at
http://propertytax.utah.gov/library/pdf/forms/pt-023.pdf (last visited 12 August
2016).
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assessor could not, according to the Hammonses, request information from the
property owners to confirm that the property is their primary residence or
withhold the exemption, the limitation restricting the exemption to one primary
residence per household would be inoperative because no one could enforce or
apply it. In fact, under the Hammonses' approach, in that situation a property
owner could own two side-by-side residences and the assessor would have no
choice but to value each applying the forty-five percent reduction under the
residential exemption. The restriction would be meaningless under that
interpretation.
The Hammonses have argued that the assessor should, in that situation,
raise any suspicion that the property does not qualify for the exemption with the
board of equalization. (R.251.) Setting aside whether the assessor would even
suspect the hypothetical property did not qualify, approaching the board would be
unavailing because, under the Hammonses' interpretation, the board could do
nothing. Subsection 103.5(3) would require the board to, absent the ordinance
referenced in section 103.5 requiring a statement, allow the exemption. 16

That would be true even if the assessor knew that the property was not a primary
residence. But under the County's interpretation, where section 103.5 succeeded
section 59-2-1102's application process, a board of equalization could still, as an
appellate body, review a county assessor's decision applying or denying a
residential exemption under section 1004 (or the property owner could pay under
protest and bring an action under section 1327).
16
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•
Because Utah law requires courts to "give effect to every provision of a
statute and avoid an interpretation that will render portions of a statute
inoperative," Thayer v. Washington County School District, 2012 UT 31, ,I 12, 285
P.3d

1142

(quotation marks and citation omitted), the County's interpretation

should be endorsed and the Hammonses' rejected.
Under the circumstances alleged in this case, section 103.5 did not prohibit
the county assessor from withholding the Hammonses' residential exemption until
they provided a statement confirming that their property was their primary
residence. That is so even though the county had not passed the ordinance
referenced in section 103.5 that would have allowed the board of equalization to
require a similar statement under certain circumstances before allowing the
exemption in the first place.
IV.

If the Court holds that the Hammonses' claims are timely, that
their claims fall within section 1321's scope, or that the county
assessor's conduct was unauthorized, the County alternatively
requests that the Court limit its opinion's retroactive effect.

If the Court finds against the County on any of the foregoing points (i.e.,
holds that the Hammonses' claims are timely, the claims fall within section 1321's
scope, or the assessor lacked authority for his actions), it alternatively requests that
the Court limit its opinion's retroactive effect to the Hammonses' suit. Such
decisions would result from a change in the law upon which the County has
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justifiably relied and that would create an undue burden on the County if fully
retroactively applied.
While the general rule is that the Court's opinions apply both retrospectively
and prospectively, the Court has stated that it "will deviate from the default rule of
retroactivity and apply [its] decision prospectively only when two requirements are
met. First, the ruling must 'result [from] a change in the law' that 'significantly
alters the legal landscape by ending or overruling a relied-upon practice."' Holmes

v. Cannon, 2016 UT 42, ,I 15, 387 P.3d 971 (quoting Monarrez, 2016 UT 10, ,I 28)
(second alteration original). Second, "the party seeking prospective application of
the ruling must also show either 'justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law,'
or that retroactive application would create an undue burden." Id. (quoting

Monarrez, 2016 UT 10, ,i 28 (citation omitted)). Should the Court rule in the
Hammonses' favor on any of the foregoing points, both requirements would be
satisfied.
First, such rulings would significantly alter the legal landscape upon which
Weber County has relied. As shown above, section 1321 claims have for decades
been subject to a four-year statute of limitation measured from the date the
disputed fees were paid. Additionally, the claims rising to the level necessary to be
actionable under section 1321 have been obvious errors readily ascertainable from
contemporaneous county records. Finally, the county assessor has assumed he
acted within his authority when he investigates properties for compliance with the
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residential exemption requirements and declines to apply the exemption if he
concludes a property does not qualify. The County submits that a decision by this
Court that alters any of those standards would represent a change in law that would
require the County to alter the way it measures limitation periods for section 1321
actions, change what it considers proper section 1321 claims, or constrain the
county assessor.
As the County has shown, the propositions upon which it has relied are

based on well-settled law. The statutes have been in place in various forms and
numbering for more than a century and the case law regarding the appropriate
limitation period was decided more than seventy years ago. Opening the doors to
additional claims that fall into one of those categories would invite more demands
for refunds of taxes that have been paid without protest and which the county has
already collected, settled, budgeted, and spent, thereby creating an undue burden.
As this Court quoted approvingly in Woodbury, permitting a right of recovery in

such situations '"would work disastrous results. It must of necessity be confined to
extreme and exceptional cases."' Woodbury, 2003 UT 28, ,I 17 (quoting 3 Cooley

on Taxation, 1295, 4th ed. (1924)). Limiting the retroactive effect of an opinion
reversing the district court on any of the foregoing points to only this suit would
avoid such an undue burden.

II
II
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the County requests that the Court affirm the
district court's entry of judgment on the pleadings on the Hammonses' first,
second, and third causes of action. Even assuming that the Hammonses' claims
were properly brought under section 1321, they were brought too late and the
Hammonses waived their ability to appeal their payments under section 1004 or
section 1327. If the Hammonses' claims were timely under section 1321, it would
not matter because they were not properly within that section's scope, i.e., they
were not based on errors readily apparent from county records at the time the
disputed payments were made. Finally, if the Hammonses' claims were timely and
properly brought under section 1321, they were not illegal because the county
assessor was authorized to investigate whether the Hammonses' home was their
primary residence and to withhold the residential exemption when he did not
receive the verification he requested from them.

If the Court reverses the district court and finds that the Hammonses' claims
are timely, are properly within section 1321's scope, or that the payments were
erroneous or illegal, the County requests that the Court limit its opinion's
retroactive effect to the Hammonses' suit.
DATE:

10 March 2017.

GoEBELANDERSON PC

s/Barton H. Kunz II
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Utah Code § 59-2-103 (2004)
Rate of assessment ofproperty - Residential property
(1) All tangible taxable property located within the state shall be
assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair
market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by
law.
(2) Subject to Subsections (3) and (4), beginning on January 1, 1995,
the fair market value of residential property located within the state
shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential exemption allowed
under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2.
(3) No more than one acre of land per residential unit may qualify for
the residential exemption.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b)(ii), beginning on
J anua:ry 1, 2005, the residential exemption in Subsection (2) is
limited to one primary residence per household.
(b) An owner of multiple residential pro:perties located within
the state is allowed a residential exemption under Subsection
(2) for:
(i) subject to Subsection (4)(a), the primary residence of
the owner; and
(ii) each residential property that is the primary
residence of a tenant.
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Utah Code § 59-2-103.5 (2002)
Procedures to obtain an exemption for residential property

(1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a county legislative
body may by ordinance require that in order for residential property
to be allowed a residential exemption in accordance with Section 592-103, an owner of the residential property shall file with the county
board of equalization a statement:
(a) on a form prescribed by the commission by rule;
(b) signed by all of the owners of the residential property;
(c) certifying that the residential property is residential
property; and
(d) containing other information as required by the commission
by rule.
(2) (a) Subject to Section 59-2-103 and except as provided in
Subsection (3), a county board of equalization shall allow an
owner described in Subsection (1) a residential exemption for
the residential property described in Subsection (1) if:
(i) the county legislative body enacts the ordinance
described in Subsection (1); and
(ii) the county board of equalization determines that the
requirements of Subsection (1) are met.
(b) A county board of equalization may require an owner of the
residential property described in Subsection (1) to file the
statement described in Subsection (1) only if:
(i) that residential property was ineligible for the
residential exemption authorized under Section 59-2103 during the calendar year immediately preceding the
calendar year for which the owner is seeking to claim the
residential exemption for that residential property;
(ii) an ownership interest in that residential property
changes; or
(iii) the county board of equalization determines that
there is reason to believe that that residential property no
longer qualifies for the residential exemption in
accordance with Section 59-2-103.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), if a county legislative body
does not enact an ordinance requiring an owner to file a statement in
accordance with this section, the county board of equalization:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(4)

(a) may not require an owner to file a statement for residential
property to be eligible for a residential exemption in accordance
with Section 59-2-103; and
(b) shall allow a residential exemption for residential property
in accordance with Section 59-2-103.
(a) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shall make
rules providing:
(i) the form for the statement described in Subsection (1);
and
(ii) the contents of the form for the statement described in
Subsection (1).
(b) The commission shall make the form described in
Subsection (4)(a) available to counties.
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Utah Code 59-2-1004 (2007)
Appeal to county board of equalization - Real property - Time period for
appeal - Decision of board - Extensions approved by commission - Appeal
to commission

•

(1)

(a) A taxpayer dissatisfied with the valuation or the equalization
of the taxpayer's real property may make an application to
appeal by:
(i) filing the application with the county board of
equalization within the time period described in
Subsection (2); or
(ii) making an application by telephone or other
electronic means within the time period described in
Subsection (2) if the county legislative body passes a
resolution under Subsection (5) authorizing applications
to be made by telephone or other electronic means.
(b) The contents of the application shall be prescribed by rule
of the county board of equalization.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), for purposes of
Subsection (1), a taxpayer shall make an application to appeal
the valuation or the equalization of the taxpayer's real property
on or before the later of:
(i) September 15 of the current calendar year; or
(ii) the last day of a 45-day period beginning on the day
on which the county auditor mails the notice under
Subsection 59-2-919(4).
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the
commission shall make rules providing for circumstances
under which the county board of equalization is required to
accept an application to appeal that is filed after the time period
prescribed in Subsection (2)(a).
(3) The owner shall include in the application under Subsection
(1)(a)(i) the owner's estimate of the fair market value of the property
and any evidence which may indicate that the assessed valuation of
the owner's property is improperly equalized with the assessed
valuation of comparable properties.
(4) (a) The county board of equalization shall meet and hold public
hearings as prescribed in Section 59-2-1001.
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(b) The county board of equalization shall make a decision on
each appeal filed in accordance with this section within a 60-

day period after the day on which the application is made.
(c) The commission may approve the extension of a time period
provided for in Subsection (4)(b) for a county board of
equalization to make a decision on an appeal.
(d) The decision of the board shall contain a determination of
the valuation of the property based on fair market value, and a
conclusion that the fair market value is properly equalized with
the assessed value of comparable properties.
(e) If no evidence is presented before the county board of
equalization, it will be presumed that the equalization issue has
been met.
C-0 (i) If the fair market value of the property that is the
subject of the appeal deviates plus or minus 5% from the
assessed value of comparable properties, the valuation of
the appealed property shall be adjusted to reflect a value
equalized with the assessed value of comparable
properties.
(ii) The equalized value established under Subsection
(4)(t)(i) shall be the assessed value for property tax
purposes until the county assessor is able to evaluate and
equalize the assessed value of all comparable properties
to bring them all into conformity with full fair market
value.
Cs) If any taxpayer is dissatisfied with the decision of the county board
of equalization, the taxpayer may file an appeal with the commission
as prescribed in Section 59-2-1006.
(6) A county legislative body may pass a resolution authorizing
taxpayers owing taxes on property assessed by that county to file
property tax appeals applications under this section by telephone or
other electronic means.
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Utah Code§ 59-2-1321 (2017)
Erroneous or illegal assessments - Deductions and refunds

The county legislative body, upon sufficient evidence being produced
that property has been either erroneously or illegally assessed, may
order the county treasurer to allow the taxes on that part of the
property erroneously or illegally assessed to be deducted before
payment of taxes. Any taxes, interest, and costs paid more than once,
or erroneously or illegally collected, may, by order of the county
legislative body, be refunded by the county treasurer, and the portion
of taxes, interest, and costs paid to the state or any taxing entity shall
be refunded to the county, and the appropriate officer shall draw a
warrant for that amount in favor of the county.
Utah Code§ 59-2-1327 (2017)
Payment of tax under protest - Circumstances where authorized - Action
to recover tax paid

Where a tax is demanded or enforced by a taxing entity, and the
person whose property is taxed claims the tax is unlawful, that person
may pay the tax under protest to the county treasurer. The person may
then bring an action in the district court against the officer or taxing
entity to recover the tax or any portion of the tax paid under protest.
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CHAPTER14
ORDINANCE OF WEB:ER COUNTY ADOPTING AND DEFJNING PROCEDURES THE COUNTY
TREASURER SHALL UTILIZE FOR NOTIFICATION AND REFUND OF REAL PROPERTY TAX
OVERPAYMENTS

l
I

Sections 6-14-1 Title
6-14-2 Purpose
6-14-3 Notification Procedure
6-14-4 Procedure for Refund of Overpaid Real Property Taxes
6-14-5 Procedure for Credit Against Current Real Property Taxes Due
6-14-6 Procedure for Reporting and Approval of The County Commission
6-14-7 Administrative Expenses
6-14-1 Title. Thls ordinance shall be known as the "Real Property Tax Overpayment Refund Procedure."

'

I
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i

6-14-2 Pmpose. To adopt procedures pursuant to Section 59-2-1321 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended
for the refund of real property tax overpayments.
~

!

6-14-3 NotificationProcedme. If real property taxes are paid more than once or overpaid on apiece of real
property the County Treasurer shall make a good firlth effort to notify the owner.of record and/or the. payor of
the real property tax overpaymont The notice shall mclude instructions concerning the procedures for obtaining

I

i
I

arefund
~

6-14-4 Procedure for refund of overpaid Real Property Taxes. If real property taxes are paid more than once or
overpaid on a piece of property, and the payor of the real property taxers requests a refund, the County
Treasurer is hereby directed to refund or pay as requested by the payor, the ovezpayment, without interest, :in a
timely manner subject to the final approval of the County Commission as required in Section 6.

~

6-14-5 Procedure for Credit Against Current Real Property Taxes Due. If the real property taxes are paid more
than once or overpaid on a piece of real property and the overpayment has not been refunded on or before
August 15, ofthe year following the overpayment, the County Treasurer shall apply the overpayment against
the current years real property tax on that same piece pfproperty and shall include .in the tax notice required by
Section 59-2-1317 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended a notification of the overpayment applied, thus
reducing the balance due on the current years real property taxes.
6-14-6 Procedure for Reporting and Approval of the County Commission. As required by Section 59-2-1320
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, the County 'freasurer shall present a report to the County Commission
for approval :indicating the activity in the overpaid tax account The report shall be prepared in a manner similar
to the following:
Balance in ove:xpaid tax account at last reporting $:XXX
add: Overpaid taxes received this period XXX
add: Interest earned on overpaid tax account this period XXX
less: Overpaid taxes refunded or credited this period :XXX
less; Administrative expenses charged this period (XXX)
·Balance· in·overpaid·taxes·account-$-J0CX· · · · · · · ··· · · · ·
6-14-:7 Administrative Expenses. The County Treasurer may deduct from the overpaid tax fund and the mterest
thereon:
a Costs for mailing and publication in connection with the unclaimed property tax overpayment;
b. A reasonable service charge for the County's administration of the unclaimed property tax account.
6~ 14-8 Severability. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or portion of tb:is ordinance is for any
reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the decisien of any court of competent jurisdietion, -such
decision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this ordinance.

l

AB
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0052

~

I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

